On August 2, several days after Premier Glen Clark fired yet another broadside as self-appointed commander-in-chief of Canadian forces in the B.C.-Alaska "salmon war," fishermen who had previously applauded his bravado were reconsidering. The source of their disillusion was his unveiling on July 30 of a "Canada First" harvesting plan outlining retaliatory measures against the U.S. for overfishing B.C. salmon. This followed the premier cancelling a U.S.-Canada economic conference for Vancouver, supporting Prince Rupert fishermen who blockaded the Alaskan ferry Malaspina, and threatening to ban U.S. torpedo testing in Nanoose Bay.

None of those actions has so far garnered a single additional salmon for B.C. fishermen and processors, while exposing the province to potential American retribution that might cost many times the economic worth of the province's entire commercial salmon catch (see story, page 18). Furthermore, a retaliatory fishery runs the risk of permanently decimating already-fragile salmon runs. And largely lost in the escalating dispute have been constructive alternatives, such as implementation of tradeable quotas, that might provide lasting relief to the beleaguered salmon and the B.C. fishermen who depend upon them.

The Glen-versus-Goliath fight, triggered by the May 20 collapse of treaty talks to set catch limits for both countries, still has wide provincial support. But when it was learned that "Canada First" options endanger salmon stocks, Vancouver gillnetter Danny Gerak complained to reporters that "the government would be better off putting its energy into enhancing the salmon runs."

Indeed, a little-discussed but crucial element of the salmon war is the fact that Mr. Clark has pulled out all the stops to defend a distinctly unprofitable industry. In 1995, the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) collected $3.4 million in licence fees while spending $49 million managing a commercial fishery that landed only $20 million worth of salmon. Furthermore, fishermen collected $60 million in unemployment-insurance benefits.

Some observers assumed matters would improve when former federal fisheries minister Fred Mifflin launched a five-year licence buyback in 1996. However, the plan has done little to reverse economic waste and nothing to discourage the ecologically-questionable practice of catching as many fish as possible before someone else claims them.

One oft-advocated alternative calls for all salmon to be handed to the lucrative sport fishery. But a new book co-written and edited by Fraser Institute environment economist Laura Jones argues that the commercial fleet can be revitalized instead by giving fishermen Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). Such quotas allot each fisherman a fixed catch before the season starts, rather than the current free-for-all for as many fish as possible.

Ms. Jones' 178-page book, Fish or Cut Bait!, predicts that an ITQ system would:

• Eliminate the need for fishermen to land huge catches in short periods and shift their focus to improving catch quality, minimizing costs and avoiding market gluts.
• Give them a direct stake in salmon stocks' health and therefore a conservation incentive.
• Enable skilled fishermen to acquire harvesting rights from inefficient players, thereby eliminating the need for Mr. Mifflin's taxpayer-funded buyback and reducing UI payouts.

However, because of their fleet-reducing potential, ITQs are vociferously opposed by union leaders. Others argue quotas are not feasible because they require complex allocation and enforcement guidelines, and a DFO restructuring.

But ITQs have revitalized Icelandic and New Zealand fisheries and already govern five B.C. fisheries. "The systems have been difficult to implement, but they're paying off," confirms Bruce Turris, the DFO's Pacific Region groundfish manager. "We're seeing trends towards long-term efficiency and sustainability."

Although experts haggle over the viability of quotas, there is little disagreement that B.C.'s salmon fishery is chronically inefficient. The downward spiral began in 1968, when then-fisheries minister Jack Davis imposed a limited-entry licensing system. Before that, any Canadian could obtain a yearly permit. The theory was that a closed pool of fishermen would be easier to manage. New licensing fees based on boat lengths were also implemented, which would presumably conserve stocks by discouraging licence holders from buying bigger vessels.

Much to Mr. Davis' consternation, fishermen reacted by improving the efficiency of existing vessels with computers, echo sounders and net-recovery gadgets which annihilated bycatch. The DFO retaliated by reducing harvest duration; by 1982, the season for the Johnstone Strait had shrunk by half from 1972's 51 days. Two years later, the opening was only three days long.

When Mr. Davis' overhaul was announced, the average capital value of a B.C. salmon boat was about $100,000. In 1980, it was over $200,000. As the money was invested, incomes dropped, leading to subsidization in the form of seasonal UI; payments for West Coast fishermen increased five-fold between 1984 and 1994.

Even with limited openings, the fleet's capacity now has a devastating effect. In 1994, over two million sockeye did not reach Fraser River spawning grounds; investigators concluded that 12 more hours of commercial fishing would have forever wiped out the run.

By 1995, the fleet's unviability was unmistakable. That year, Ottawa collected $3.4 million in commercial licence fees, compared to $49 million spent on management. The landed value of salmon, which was about $200 million annually in the late 1980s, dropped to $20 million. UI cushioned fishermen to the tune of $63 million.

Last year's figures were hardly more encouraging. About $6.8 million was collected in fees, $49 million was spent on management, and the landed value of salmon rose to $47 million (but only because of a record-breaking Skeena River return). UI payments hovered at $65 million.

Ottawa's remedy was to launch another bureaucratically-driven overhaul, this one to reduce the 4,234-strong fleet by 50%. The five-year Mifflin plan includes an $80-million program to buy back licences and the division of the coast into two licence areas for the 535-strong seine fleet and three areas for the 839-boat gillnet, 606-boat troll and 2,254-boat combination gillnet-troll fleets. Each vessel was issued a single licence; those wanting to operate in another area had to buy out a licensee there.

Today, the salmon fleet totals 3,381 vessels: 491 seiners, 864 trollers and 2,026 gillnetters. Combination gillnet-trollers, which travelled more extensively than the other vessels, have been eliminated.

Maple Ridge-based gillnetter Larry Salmi says "the fleet reduction had to happen. It eliminated the slip-shod players, and now only the professionals are left." These professionals should now enjoy a modest income hike courtesy of fewer people catching the same amount of fish.

Earning a steady income is another matter. Last year, many northern-based fishermen made over $120,000 thanks to the Skeena run. This year it is predicted each will make about $17,000, partly because of Alaskan overfishing. "Ottawa trapped us," complains Prince Rupert gillnetter Tom Parks, explaining that his colleagues can't remedy the situation by buying southern licences because they sell for an estimated $100,000 apiece.

Economist Jones insists the Mifflin plan will not revitalize the industry because "it controls the number of fish caught indirectly rather than directly. Competition still takes the form of 'racing'--increasing the effort to catch the most salmon first."

The Fraser Institute organized workshops in May and November 1996 in which fishermen, DFO representatives and academics discussed how to salvage the industry. ITQs became the hot topic, and data on existing quotas and a pilot salmon fishery blueprint were developed in hopes of inspiring Ottawa to green-light a test fishery. But as Fish or Cut Bait! was being readied for publication, attention was diverted to the so-called war between the U.S. and B.C., with Mr. Clark acting as chief publicist and provocateur.

Canada has struggled for three years to renew a harvest-limit agreement with the U.S. (the 1985 Pacific salmon treaty harvest limits expired in 1994, and since then each party has accused the other of overfishing B.C.-bound salmon). The latest round of talks broke down on May 20 when the U.S. demanded 20% of the Fraser River run and Canada insisted it take less than 15%.

Mr. Clark upped the ante in early June by declaring that if there was no salmon treaty he would terminate the U.S. Navy's seabed lease at the Nanoose Bay torpedo test range. Unimpressed, Alaskans began harvesting the sockeye which pass their coast into the Skeena and Nass rivers the following month. "Those SOBs went fishing ahead of us knowing we'll cut back if there aren't enough fish remaining," fumed Dennis Brown, B.C. government advisor and former United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union secretary-treasurer. The Alaskans countered that the sockeye landings were a permissable bycatch that unavoidably occurred while fishing for less-valuable pink salmon.

Over 470,000 sockeye were caught, four times what the old treaty allowed. Mr. Brown promised revenge in the form of British Columbians catching as many as possible of the 20 million salmon migrating through Canadian waters in August, thereby depriving Washington state fishermen of a crack at Fraser-bound sockeye.

On July 19, militant fishermen commenced a three-day blockade of the Alaskan ferry Malaspina in Prince Rupert. Mr. Clark applauded their "courageous resistance" and subsequently offered to pay their legal bills when the state filed suit against them and Ottawa for $2 million in damages.

On July 25, the premier struck again, cancelling an economic conference involving five U.S. states, B.C. and Alberta scheduled for Vancouver in November. The Americans seemed little injured; the Pacific Northwest Economic Region conference was promptly re-booked in Idaho.

However unproductive in economic terms or in convincing the Americans to reduce their catch, Mr. Clark's campaign initially enjoyed a swell of public support. But it ebbed when he urged the DFO to implement his "Canada First" retaliatory plan. The Vancouver Sun revealed on August 2 that eight of the 13 options to govern B.C. fishermen for the remainder of the season would harm salmon stocks. For example, a proposed aggressive Fraser sockeye harvest would result in large bycatches of chinook, coho and steelhead, some of which are endangered.

Gillnetter Gerak points out that thousands of young salmon will also be killed. "You can't just release a coho or a spring during a heavy sockeye run," he worries. "All that weight [of the nets] crushes everything." He says Canada should give the Americans their desired 20% Fraser River catch to end the treaty dispute, then focus on enhancing salmon runs. "You could make up the lost percentage by increasing stocks."

Enter ITQs, which have increased fish stocks in Iceland, New Zealand and B.C. Quotas were implemented in several Iceland fisheries in the 1970s because operating costs were exceeding catch values. Since then, all Icelandic fisheries have switched to ITQs. Depleted stocks like herring have recovered, and since 1990 the catch value per fishermen has increased by 20%. Moreover, the number of fishermen has increased from 5,800 to 6,800 because the revitalized industry could afford a new fleet of freezer-trawlers.

New Zealand has reaped similar benefits since imposing quotas in 1986. The licences of 2,260 part-time, tax-subsidized fishermen were cancelled, and depleted species like rock lobster now thrive. Prior to ITQs the export value of the country's fisheries was NZ$100 million; today it is NZ$1.3 billion.

In B.C., ITQs were imposed on the geoduck fishery in 1989, the halibut fishery in 1991, the sea urchin and sea cucumber fisheries in 1996 and the groundfish trawl fishery, B.C.'s largest-volume fishery, this year. In all cases quotas were implemented "because of conservation concerns," says Mr. Turris.

The halibut fishery is arguably most comparable to salmon, as technological advances enabled the 435-strong fleet to harvest 8.5 million pounds during six days in 1990, compared to a similar volume requiring 65 days a decade earlier. The halibut hunt resulted in hard-to-supervise short seasons, poor product quality and supply gluts.

ITQs expanded the season to eight months and allotted catch quotas to licence holders based on vessel length and historical catch. The halibut fleet has since decreased to 260 vessels, but landed prices have risen by $1.50 per pound because fishermen can time landings to periods of high demand. This has led to a $3.6-million revenue increase and a $440,000 harvesting-cost decrease. When asked in 1992 to vote on whether to keep ITQs, 91% of licensees voted in favour.

As elsewhere, B.C. ITQs are managed via landings-control systems whereby catches are weighed at dockside and species composition verified. Industry pays for observers, who would otherwise have been dispatched by the DFO at taxpayers' expense, to monitor catch areas. "Quotas are a great tool considering our decreasing budget," says Mr. Turris.

In Fish or Cut Bait!, Ms. Jones outlines a troll salmon pilot ITQ project. It would last for at least two years and work best if implemented within an existing licensing area on a voluntary basis (the west coasts of the Queen Charlotte and Vancouver Islands would be suitable). Coho and chinook would be the easiest species to manage because they reside in local waters longer than pink, chum or sockeye. Equal allocation distribution (as opposed to allocations based on vessel length) is favoured because it is less complicated to implement. Acknowledging the difficulty in estimating run sizes before the season begins, Ms. Jones suggests initially setting the total catch at a low level and adjusting it as run-size information changes.

Catch should not exceed quotas by more than 2%, and excess amounts would be deducted from next year's quota. Similarly, up to 5% of uncaught quota could be transferred to the following year. The fishery would remain open until all quota is caught, except when weak stocks passing through an area require closures.

The B.C. test fishery would employ the same landings-control system as halibut, and penalties for overfishing would include the permanent loss of ITQs. Quota holders would be required to give daily reports regarding hours worked, fuel consumption, wages paid and species and volumes of fish caught and processed.

An analyst who wishes to remain anonymous counters that an ITQ system will not work "because the fish come up-river all at once in August and it will be too difficult to manage. Salmon biology locks us into short harvests, and that eliminates ITQ benefits like avoiding market gluts." Ms. Jones agrees salmon fishermen will never experience the huge expansion enjoyed by halibut licence holders, "but there is still opportunity to lengthen openings over the long run. What's the harm in trying?"

Other problems could be solved over the long term. Processing plants geared to handle large runs may suffer if the period of catch is stretched out. "That might mean more unemployment, but that could be rectified by reorganizing existing facilities or a proliferation of smaller plants," says Ms. Jones.

Assuming the pilot project was a success and the entire salmon fishery fell under an ITQ system, it would still be at the mercy of a renegade Alaskan fleet. "But maybe the Alaskans would see the benefits of our system and implement their own quotas," suggests Ms. Jones. "There would conceivably be no need for disputes between Canada and the U.S."

This notion is not entirely far-fetched. The success of B.C.'s halibut ITQ system prompted Alaskan herring fishermen to lobby for a similar system. They obtained it in 1995.

Mr. Turris says the toughest part of implementing ITQs "is trying to change the mindset of fishermen, who continue to regard the resource as an unrestricted opportunity." He adds that fears of de facto privatization are somewhat misplaced, given that the public resource already "belongs" to an elite group of licence holders.

Some analysts think ITQs don't go far enough. Elizabeth Brubaker, executive director of the Energy Probe Research Foundation in Toronto, argues that quotas should be succeeded as soon as possible by outright privatization in order to remove Ottawa entirely from management. "Otherwise harvest levels will remain susceptible to political pressures," she says. Ms. Brubaker predicts stock enhancement would reach an all-time high, because "fishermen would be solely responsible for the resource that gives them their livelihood."

Ms. Jones and Mr. Turris doubt outright privatization will ever occur. Moreover, "ITQs may be enough to revitalize the salmon fishery," the former predicts.

Mr. Turris suspects salmon ITQs will be tested soon. "We're currently considering putting quotas on our herring industry. ITQs have had a domino effect in B.C., and if herring is the next domino to fall, it's very likely salmon will fall after that."

But for now, incoming salmon remain at the mercy of warring fishermen. Last week, it was learned that Mr. Clark told federal Defence Minister Art Eggleton and Fisheries Minister David Anderson he will not retract his plan to cancel the Nanoose Bay seabed lease later this month if a treaty isn't reached. He also threatened to sue Ottawa if it expropriates the seabed.

For his part, Mr. Brown acknowledges the "Canada First" plan may threaten stocks. But, he insists, "at no point will we continue" with an expanded retaliatory fishery "if it threatens fish."

Ottawa, meanwhile, has appointed retiring University of B.C. president David Strangway to meet with various interested parties in the salmon spat. He and former U.S. cabinet minister William Ruckelshaus will seek fresh ways to reopen negotiations.

All this is a sad spectacle to Ms. Jones. "Every year there's a crisis in the fishery, and every year we become obsessed with finding band-aid cures," she says. "We can't afford to take that route anymore. We have to learn from past mistakes and start implementing long-term solutions."

—Robin Brunet

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