Even last week's tabling of federal Finance Minister Paul Martin's historic balanced budget—the first in 28 years—failed to push Canada's ever-escalating unity crisis into the background. Bickering between federalist and separatist politicians erupted in the House of Commons over the use of the Canadian flag at the Olympics. Hockey commentator Don Cherry's Francophone-bashing provoked a furious response from separatists in Quebec City and—amazingly—CBC management defended their curmudgeon. Saturday Night magazine published a long essay detailing the unnerving parallels between the situation in Canada today and the pre-Civil War period in the United States. All in all, the tone was ugly, and it promises to get worse.

The catalyst for the latest war of words between the two solitudes was the Supreme Court of Canada hearing two weeks ago where Ottawa argued that Quebec does not have a legal right to secede without the approval of the other provinces. Reaction in Quebec ranged from rage to scorn, and polls suggest that the net effect was to push Quebec one step closer to secession—with or without Canada's approval.

The long march to this fractious and fragile state began with the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s and proceeded through the FLQ crisis and the election of Quebec's first separatist government in 1976, the first separation referendum in 1980 and the patriation of the constitution without Quebec's approval in 1982, failed attempts to amend the document in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating with the re-election of a separatist government in 1994 and a second near-successful secession vote in 1995.

With rumours of another Quebec election swirling in the air, perhaps as soon as this spring, and Premier Lucien Bouchard's firm promise of a third secession referendum as soon as conditions are optimal for a Yes vote, Canada is closer to break-up today than at any time in its history. Moreover, as the unthinkable becomes the probable, the debate is focusing increasingly on the terms of secession, and the integrity of Quebec's borders in particular. Therein lies enormous potential for conflict, as the Anglophone, Indian and immigrant enclaves within the province exhort the federal government to guarantee that it will do whatever is necessary to enforce Canada's sovereignty over—if not all Quebec—at least those regions that vote against secession.

The federalist strategy for countering the gathering momentum of the sovereigntist movement is twofold. The first tack, known as Plan A, is the latest version of Ottawa's appeasement strategy. It revolves around the Calgary Declaration cobbled together by Canada's provincial premiers (sans Quebec) last year, which promises to recognize the "unique character" of the province, presumably in some future constitutional amendment. The second tack, Plan B, is aimed at Quebeckers whom Ottawa hopes will respond to "tough love." It warns them that secession is probably illegal (hence the Supreme Court reference) and hints of dire economic and political consequences in the event of a Yes vote.

If Ottawa's strategy fails, there is a high probability of a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec, followed by political and economic upheaval and internecine violence. To date, there has been no serious discussion of how Canada and Quebec would cope with this scenario. Ottawa's request to the Supreme Court for legal clarification tacitly recognizes that there is no specific law governing secession. It also points to what seems to be an obvious conclusion: Canada needs such a law.

A set of legal rules governing the secession of Quebec, or any province, almost certainly belongs in the constitution. Whatever it is called—the secession amendment, exit clause or escape hatch—it would explicitly set out the requirements a province would have to meet before it could be considered as having legally expressed its desire to leave Canada, and it would lay out the framework for the negotiations that would follow. It would put an end to the separatist monopoly over defining what sovereignty would mean and how it could occur, and it would minimize the risk of violent, chaotic secession.

"Clearly it's a good strategy," says University of Calgary political scientist and constitutional law expert Ted Morton. "It would minimize the likelihood of a messy and/or violent separation—especially since the more messy and violent a secession is the worse it would be for both new countries." Prof. Morton believes that by clarifying the terms and conditions of separation, a secession clause would likely have the effect of discouraging Quebeckers from taking the ultimate step. As a relentless critic of governments that abdicate difficult social and political issues to judges, Prof. Morton admires the proposal for its democratic, political underpinnings. "This is a much better way to go," he says, "than screwing around with the Supreme Court."

Gordon Robertson has watched the unity crisis unfold from a particularly privileged perch. He was the Clerk of the Privy Council—the top civil servant in Ottawa—from 1963 to 1975, and secretary to the federal cabinet on federal-provincial relations from 1975 to 1979. He too believes the concept of a secession amendment has merit. "This kind of thing would be very useful," says Mr. Robertson. "It's highly desirable to have a great deal of discussion over the legal problems [of secession] because they could cause very serious troubles if they are not discussed and resolved early."

The first part of an exit clause would say, "Okay, you want to separate? Here's how it should be done," says University of Calgary political science professor Rainer Knopff. This would certainly entail a requirement for a referendum and "a requirement for a clear question and a definition of what constitutes a significant majority," suggests Thomas d'Aquino, president and chief executive officer of the Business Council on National Issues. The wording of the referendum question has always been contentious, but the amendment would eliminate uncertainty because its invocation would, by definition, mean that the vote was about secession.

The first part would also set the voting threshold required for a referendum to be considered successful. "It is not sufficient to have 50% plus one on a matter of this importance," says Mr. Robertson. "But if you go as high as two-thirds, people could vote carelessly, thinking with a threshold that high it would not matter." A reasonable compromise, then, would set the benchmark around 60%.

The second component of the amendment would set out the broad parameters that would guide the negotiations with a province that had legally expressed its desire to secede. Here questions of borders, division of debt and assets, currency arrangements, international trade and security agreements and citizenship would be dealt with.

The borders issue is bound to be most difficult. As the prospect of Quebec's separation has become more likely in recent years, strident federalists both inside and outside the province have been promoting the idea of partition as a way to raise fears among soft-nationalist Quebeckers that separation would not be viable or worth the cost. The proposal raises more questions than it answers, however. How would the internal borders be drawn? What sort of requirements would have to be met for a region to partition itself? And perhaps most important, if Canada and a region of a seceding province decide it should remain part of Canada, how would it be enforced? "I am 99% certain the rest of Canada would never allow their troops to be sent to open fire on other Canadians," says Fraser Institute senior fellow in Canadian studies Gordon Gibson. "And there's no other way to enforce partition."

If Canadians are not prepared to go to war on behalf of partitionists, this would have to be recognized in the secession amendment by stating unequivocally that when the exit clause is invoked by a seceding province, its borders must be considered inviolate. In the Quebec context, this would be resisted most vigorously by natives who claim a legal relationship with Canada that supersedes their relationship with the provincial government. "The solution is really obvious," suggests Mr. Gibson. "The Cree of northern Quebec can make a deal with Lucien Bouchard. What they want is self-government and resources—Lucien Bouchard can give it to them, Jean Chretien cannot."

A suggestion for dealing with the division of debt and assets lies in a 1995 study conducted by the Fraser Institute. The Fraser formula weighed population figures and financial obligations and concluded that Quebec's share of the national debt would be $143.9 billion. As the study points out, however, this would leave Quebec the 21st most indebted country in the world, just behind Liberia. Further, to maintain services and pay off that colossal debt, Quebec taxes would have to rise 32%.

A simpler method, and one which would likely find more support in Quebec since it would be seen as more flexible, would be to establish a binding dispute resolution mechanism, a fixture of contemporary international trade agreements. Following that model, the secession amendment would call for the creation a binational panel composed of one representative from Canada, one from the seceding province, and a mutually agreed upon arbitrator. The panel would be expected to negotiate a binding agreement within six months of a successful referendum. Beyond debt obligations, the panel could also negotiate the division of real estate and military assets.

The secession amendment would also, presumably, assert that Canada retain exclusive jurisdiction over its currency and monetary policy, although the departing province would be free to use the Canadian dollar if it wished. Further, it would clearly be in the best interest of both states for Canada to make a commitment to attempt to bring the former province into all existing trade and military agreements as soon as possible.

Finally, the thorny issue of Canadian citizenship would have to be resolved. "Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms it would not be legally possible for the Canadian government to strip [the residents of a seceding province] of their Canadian citizenship or any of the rights that go with that," explains Immigration Counsel of Canada president Keith Frank. This would mean, however, that residents of the new state would also retain their right to vote in Canadian elections. A reasonable compromise might offer residents of a former province the same rights as landed immigrants. "This means you have all the rights that full citizens have, except the right to vote," says Mr. Frank.

Quebec Equality Party leader Keith Henderson, who calls the concept of a secession amendment "perfectly logical," insists that Quebeckers must retain their citizenship. He also refuses to accept the concept of inviolate provincial borders. His posture illustrates how difficult it would be to get the Anglophone minority to agree to terms that might be acceptable outside the province.

Constitutional experts are divided as to how the constitution should be amended to incorporate an exit clause. "It's an amendment that could be put in with the 7/50 formula [requiring the approval of seven provinces representing 50% of Canada's population] since it does not affect [existing provincial boundaries]," suggests Prof. Morton. In political reality, however, considering that patriating the constitution in 1982 without Quebec's approval has in large part helped perpetuate the secession crisis Canada now faces, an amendment of this magnitude would require something close to unanimous consent of the provinces and Ottawa to be effective.

Osgoode Hall law professor Patrick Monahan undertook an international study of secession law in 1996. He found seven countries with constitutional escape hatches: Austria, Ethiopia, France, Singapore, St. Christopher and Nevis, and the pre-break-up Soviet Union and Czechoslovak Republic. He says that in general the laws are "an attempt to forestall secession by saying it's possible, but only under certain, difficult circumstances." He adds the exit clauses do not necessarily encourage secessionist sentiment; rather, "they come about more as a result of it," and as a way to deal with it. While he is only lukewarm to Canada adopting an exit clause, Prof. Monahan concedes that "it could help the federal cause to have a clarification of the rules."

In his study Prof. Monahan was more supportive of a secession amendment. He argued that the silence of the existing Canadian constitution on the issue "should be no comfort to federalists who might imagine that the absence of a constitutional procedure for secession makes such an outcome impossible...Canada is a democracy whose ultimate legal and political foundation is the consent of Canadians to be governed under the Canadian constitution and Canadian law. If a sufficiently large and determined majority of Canadians in a particular province withdraw that consent, then the absence of appropriate legal wording to achieve secession will not prevent them from realizing their goal." He further warned that the lack of such provisions is a dangerous situation that will lead to "confusion and conflict."

Christopher Sands monitors Canada at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Mr. Sands reports that he heard Ottawa bureaucrats discussing the idea of a constitutional exit clause before the 1995 referendum. "It was an attempt to put a legal framework around an unpredictable event," he explains, adding that "depending on how it was drafted it would certainly have some benefits."

Those benefits would include avoidance of the confusion and conflict of an unplanned separation, but the clause could also play a role in convincing soft nationalists to move to the federalist side. Polls taken shortly after the 1995 referendum showed that almost one-third of Quebeckers voted Yes in the belief that a successful referendum would leave the province part of Canada. Since the proposed amendment would deal explicitly with separation, not "sovereignty association" or some other half-measure, voters would have a far better understanding of the momentous consequences of a Yes vote.

Some observers suggest an exit clause is too radical and for the moment unnecessary, but could be brought in after the next Quebec election if the separatists win and the momentum toward a successful sovereignty referendum looks unstoppable. But if the idea languishes until after the Supreme Court ruling, expected in six to eight months, and the court declares a unilateral declaration of independence illegal, then any attempt to subsequently negotiate a constitutional secession amendment will be seen in Quebec as a last-ditch attempt to thwart the democratic process there.

A workable and successfully implemented secession clause could enhance Canada's international reputation for enlightened statecraft. Most armed conflict in the world today is produced by domestic tensions within countries. Imperialism and colonialism are nearly defunct (or at least dormant), and the end of the Cold War dramatically lowered tensions between the superpowers and their proxy states. The rise of ethnic tensions, in countries such as Spain, the United Kingdom and Russia, as well as Canada, has been one of the consequences of the New World Order. Liberalized global trade and advanced communications technology, meanwhile, have further eroded the significance of national borders. "Boundaries are less important than they used to be," says National Citizens' Coalition president Stephen Harper. "They are always changing, and I suppose its happening even faster now."

B.C. Conservative Senator Pat Carney, who has been pilloried by what she calls the "central Canadian pig media" who accused her of raising the possibility of B.C. secession in recent months, says the secession clause must be judged "through the lens of your own province." All provinces would benefit from a secession clause, and not only from the increased stability that an end to the unity crisis would bring. Ottawa would be severely constrained from initiating policies that intruded on provincial jurisdiction. Alberta, for instance, would never face another National Energy Program, and B.C. would probably be spared Supreme Court decisions like Delgamuukw, which granted Indians "co-management" over provincial resources to which they could prove title. Laval University political scientist Guy Laforest says a secession amendment would end the "imperialist" reign of the federal government in Canada.

Prof. Laforest says an exit clause would be eminently saleable in Quebec. "Nationalists here are fine with the idea of a secession clause in the constitution," he says, "but not as an add-on to the existing constitution—rather as a part of a reconstructed constitution—a new partnership." In other words, nationalists would demand an entirely new deal with Ottawa where they have far more powers as well as the succession clause.

It is hard for the Anglophone mind to grasp the notion that a constitutional escape hatch would not be enough for Quebec, but it might at least be enough to re-engage the separatists in a civil debate. Bloc Quebecois MP Pierre de Savoye calls the idea "quite interesting. Sooner or later it will have to happen; if it happens under duress it could be difficult indeed, and it will clearly lead to chaos," he says. "Were we to try and find some common ground in advance that could only help people to think clearly and find out how that could unfold in a rational manner." Mr. de Savoye says Bloc MPs who fanned out across the country last month were attempting to initiate just such a dialogue.

Mr. de Savoye points out that some of the suggested terms of the amendment would be rejected by both the separatist and federalist leadership. La Presse political columnist Chantal Hebert predicts the provinces would likewise be unable to agree on the terms. "English Canada has never been able to decide what it would want from secession," she says. "It doesn't strike me as clear that provinces like Alberta and Prince Edward Island would meet on the issue."

Nonetheless, advocates of the idea like Mr. Robertson say an attempt to draft a secession amendment would be worthwhile even if ultimately unsuccessful. "There's value in these things even if they don't go very far," he says, because anything that contributes to increased clarity in the debate is helpful.

In some respects, the Reform Party would be the logical champion of an exit clause. The party is on the record as supporting efforts to spell out the terms and consequences of separation to Quebeckers. Furthermore, it supports the Liberals' Supreme Court reference, which presumably means it believes that secession, if it occurs, must conform to some kind of legal framework. And the party is ostensibly a champion of devolution of federal powers to the provinces, a certain by-product of an exit clause. "It would be a good initiative for the Reform Party," says Prof. Morton. "It will flesh out the fact that the Liberal leadership is willing to sacrifice the best interest of [English Canada] in these negotiations."

But Reform is striving mightily to shed its image, especially in Ontario, as a radical movement bent on driving Quebec out of the federation. Its enemies would be certain to portray the party as a nation-wrecker if it championed a secession amendment. And leader Preston Manning is astute enough to recognize a no-win political issue when he sees one. "This kind of constitutional stuff just couldn't get done," he says, although he expresses openness to at least discussing the idea. He explains that Reform's preference is to "make explicit the terms and conditions of separation, but in legislation, not in the constitution—and we need to make sure it is balanced with a renewal of the federation."

When it comes to an exit clause, however, the legislative, non-constitutional approach fails on at least two counts. First it would be done without the participation or consent of the Quebec government. "Ottawa is already seen in Quebec as an imperial government," says Laval's Prof. Laforest. "This would just tell Quebeckers we have ownership of Quebec and there's no way it can go without our permission." Second, rules governing such a profound change to the structure of the federation surely ought to be enshrined in the country's constitution.

The federal Liberals are even less likely to adopt the proposal, not least because it would severely curtail Ottawa's ability to intrude on provincial jurisdiction and tend, over time, to have a profoundly devolutionary effect on the federation. Ottawa's unity strategy, for the moment, relies on the promise of "sound government," as Prime Minister Jean Chretien has said (last week's pledge by Mr. Martin of three consecutive balanced budgets—for the first time in 50 years—is central to Ottawa's sound government promise), coupled with modest appeasement offered in the premier-driven Calgary Declaration. The declaration, however, seems doomed by its internal illogic. "Clause five grants special powers to Quebec to preserve the French language and culture, while clause six says any power granted to one province should be given to all," explains NCC president Harper, one of the declaration's harshest critics. "Well, how does the ability to promote the French language help the other provinces?" In effect, the document simultaneously offers special status to Quebec and equality for all the provinces. If the former is true, it will not fly in Canada. If the latter is true, it will crash in Quebec. "If anything at all even comes of this, which seems very unlikely," says Mr. Harper, "I don't see how you can reconcile the two."

On the other hand, meaningful devolution of power to the provinces is more likely to succeed as a unity solution, although it is difficult to see how this could happen without a secession clause. Furthermore, it is doubtful that this alone would work. "We have been trying to come up with plums to keep the separatists happy for 30 years now," says Mr. Harper. "It won't happen. They do not want more power; they want their own country and offering them more and more only legitimizes their position."

The NCC president's opinion is echoed by Mr. Sands. "Canadians have bent over backward trying with a remarkable amount of patience to legitimately address Quebec concerns," he notes, "while at the same time trying to preserve good government for the rest of Canada." He points out that since the 1960s, which ushered in the era of coerced bilingualism, Quebeckers have been disproportionately represented in the prime minister's office, the cabinet and the senior echelons of the civil service and the military. The province has been a huge beneficiary of transfer payments, public works and asymmetrical devolution of power. The largesse has subsided in recent years because of the national preoccupation with deficit reduction, but as Unity Minister Dion himself recently pointed out, "Year after year, Quebeckers [still] contribute about 21% to 22% of federal revenues and receive 25% of federal program expenditures."

Mr. D'Aquino describes himself as a "strong supporter of the need for rules governing secession," although like Mr. Manning, he supports a legislative rather than constitutional approach. Nonetheless he predicts that among many Canadians, and especially the political establishment, the proposed secession amendment will instantly provoke anger and fear. "Some people who will oppose this idea will be the ones who say a country cannot be broken so just forget about it," he explains. "I don't buy that. If Quebec in a truly democratic referendum voted 90% to leave not one could stop them nor would they want to. What we would want is that Quebec not leave in the middle of the night and not without rules."

—Brian Mulawka and Paul Bunner

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