The 1990s are ending the way they began: a premier labouring under the weight of innumerable scandals, accusations of criminal behaviour, collapsing caucus support and historically low poll numbers. In 1995 premier Mike Harcourt faced a remarkably similar set of circumstances and chose to "take a bullet for the party." In 1999, Glen Clark, like Bill Vander Zalm in 1991, is seemingly determined to make his party take a bullet for him. A coup d'etat forced Mr. Vander Zalm from office—too late, however, to save the Social Credit Party. Will Mr. Clark be ousted in time to save the New Democratic Party?

The NDP is fast running out of options, even as Mr. Clark insists he will stay the course—a course he has again altered radically, with the appointments of former Liberal and Progressive Democratic Alliance leader Gordon Wilson as finance minister and the unsinkable Moe Sihota as minister of social development and economic security.

On August 13—Friday the Thirteenth—B.C. Supreme Court Associate Chief Justice Patrick Dohm is expected to release the search warrants he authorized the RCMP to use in March to search the homes of Mr. Clark and the other principals in the Pilarinos affair. The raid followed the issuing of a temporary charity-casino licence to Dimitrios Pilarinos, Mr. Clark's neighbour and friend, and strip-club owner Stephen Ng. On July 30 conflict of interest commissioner H.A.D. Oliver, who is conducting his own investigation into the scandal, received copies of the warrants, which had previously been restricted to lawyers and their clients.

Mr. Clark's reputation, and that of his party, was already in tatters before the shocking March 2 raid on his residence, played out before BCTV cameras. Two "fudge-it budgets," a lengthy provincial recession, skyrocketing deficits and provincial debt, the collapse of the forestry, fishing and mining industries, the "fast ferries" overrun and other bungles had seen to that. But the raid and the subsequent revelations that the premier had misled the public about his relationship with Mr. Pilarinos—he had not only holidayed with Mr. Clark but had done renovations on his house (which might or might not have been fully paid for)—drove down NDP support to a pathetic 16%.

Mr. Clark has remained characteristically cocky—continuing to blame the media for his troubles—if somewhat shell-shocked. He has even boasted that his 19% popularity bests his party's. At a July 20 press conference, he dashed many NDP hopes when he announced he would soldier on. "I'm not here for a good time, as you obviously can tell," he admitted. "I'm here because I care deeply about what I campaigned on and the people I represent, and I want to continue doing that, as long as I have the support in caucus and the party."

That support is marginal at best. The press conference came at the end of a tumultuous week that saw the resignations of finance minister Joy MacPhail, women's equality minister Sue Hammell, NDP provincial secretary Brian Gardiner and Mr. Clark's parliamentary secretary, Graeme Bowbrick. It was then revealed that Mr. Clark had earlier received a letter from former MLA Leonard Krog and Bernie Simpson, the latter a party fundraiser nicknamed "The Bagman." The letter-writers urged the premier to step down for the good of the party; they claimed support from at least 20 NDPers, including such heavyweights as former cabinet ministers Alex Macdonald, Bill Barlee and Darlene Marzari. Mr. Macdonald said publicly, "Glen should take the lead and have a leadership convention. This present attitude of 'come and get me' is bad for everyone."

The NDP has 40 MLAs. If 21 refused to recognize Mr. Clark as premier (or if as few as six voted for a Liberal non-confidence motion) he would be finished. Either of these options, however, could unleash the dreaded "doomsday device"—an election that would not only finish off Mr. Clark sure enough, but also his caucus. (British prime minister John Major used this threat to stay in power in the waning days of his administration.) Faced with this disaster scenario in 1991, Social Credit MLAs worked behind the scenes designing a meticulous plot to oust Mr. Vander Zalm. Jack Weisgerber, the former Socred cabinet minister and B.C. Reform leader who now sits as an independent MLA, says it took three years for the Socred caucus to finally oust its intransigent leader. The crisis began in 1988 with the resignations of cabinet ministers Grace McCarthy and Brian Smith and came to a head in December 1990 when the premier's principal secretary, Jerry Lampert, resigned. This was shortly after the Fantasy Gardens scandal destroyed any hope of a Vander Zalm rehabilitation. Mrs. McCarthy suggested the caucus might expedite matters by asking Lieutenant Governor David Lam to remove Mr. Vander Zalm from office.

Mr. Weisgerber explains that the Socreds were desperate. "It became evident the entire party would be wiped out under Mr. Vander Zalm's leadership should he take the party into the next election," he says. "I keep reminding myself Bill Vander Zalm came under the kind of pressure Glen Clark is under from his caucus. But Bill Vander Zalm withstood it for three years." Socred MLAs had direct conversations with Mr. Lam, who agreed he would turn down Mr. Vander Zalm if asked to dissolve the Legislature and issue an election writ. In turn, Mr. Lam asked the Socreds to select a replacement leader while he investigated the coup's legal ramifications. The research was done and the plans were put in place.

Mr. Vander Zalm resigned from office April 2, 1991, after then-conflict of interest commissioner Ted Hughes found he had violated the rules in the sale of Fantasy Gardens to a Taiwanese billionaire. Rita Johnston was chosen as the replacement premier after a secret ballot. The Socreds were free of Mr. Vander Zalm—but too late. They had only six months left in their mandate, not enough time for Mrs. Johnston to establish herself. The NDP has less than two years left in the Clark mandate—and the clock is ticking. As Vancouver Sun columnist Vaughn Palmer has pointed out, "To rid themselves of a leader who is as ruthless as he is unpopular, the New Democrats would have to be brave and determined. But no more so than the Socreds who blazed the way back in 1991."

Mike Harcourt, who led the NDP to victory in 1991, proved to be less intractable and more civic-minded than either Mr. Vander Zalm or Mr. Clark. He resigned shortly after it was revealed the New Democrats had received money stolen from Nanaimo charities. Bingogate has since led to criminal charges against the New Democrat newspaper, former cabinet minister Dave Stupich and his relations. Stupich pleaded guilty and will be sentenced later this year.

Ironically, Mr. Clark was foremost among the cabinet ministers who persuaded Mr. Harcourt to throw in the towel. "When your own team starts to squabble among themselves, that's the time to go," Mr. Harcourt declared in his February 1996 farewell speech. "It's tough to take."

Now that Brutus has become Caesar, Mr. Clark knows just how Mr. Harcourt felt. Electioneering by Mr. Clark's would-be successors has already begun (see story, page 19), even as the premier, more Nixonian than ever, insists he is not a "quitter." The three likely candidates are Ms. MacPhail, Attorney General Ujjal Dosanjh and Finance Minister Wilson. The first-ever NDP premier, Dave Barrett, now acting as a party fixer, has reportedly warned Mr. Dosanjh that his apparent campaigning for his boss' job is unseemly. Mr. Dosanjh and Ms. MacPhail are among the dozen or so MLAs that have called on Mr. Clark in caucus to resign. Mr. Wilson, whose failing career was rescued by the premier, remains loyal—for now.

Mr. Clark's partisans, led by NDP second-in-command Sihota, insist that the leadership question can wait until the next party convention in March 2000. Privately, however, Clark supporters have said that he has until autumn to enunciate a new direction and bring up his poll numbers.

But Mr. Clark's problems are more serious than mere policy. A great many British Columbians consider him dishonest—a fatal perception that dispatched Mr. Vander Zalm, just as it did Brian Mulroney. To put it bluntly, they think he is a liar, a contention that was only strengthened recently when in a wrongful dismissal suit arising from the Hydrogate scandal, where a B.C. Hydro-backed plant in Pakistan is losing $80,000 a day, a B.C. Supreme Court justice essentially accused Mr. Clark of mendacity.

Liberal leader Gordon Campbell says public distrust of the premier began when it was revealed the NDP had lied about the 1996 budget. Mr. Clark had won a come-from-behind victory over Mr. Campbell buttressed by his promise that the province's budget was in the black. It was actually in a deficit, a fact well known to Finance Ministry bureaucrats, at the very least. "What's happened with Mr. Clark is he keeps on piling it on himself," Mr. Campbell charges. "I think it's clear people know when Glen Clark opens his mouth, there is a darn good chance he is not telling the truth."

What prevents the NDP caucus from doing to their leader what the Socreds did to theirs is a lack of courage. None of the high-profile NDPers who have resigned has dared to speak out publicly against Mr. Clark, although Ms. MacPhail and Ms. Hammell dropped sly hints. Mr. Clark's supporters, some of them anyway, are willing to speak openly in his favour. Backbencher Rick Kasper, considered by some a maverick, dismisses the calls for a leadership change, demanding to know why the dissidents did not act at June's NDP convention. He says caustically of Mr. Krog's letter, "Who cares—he lost two elections." Seemingly optimistic, he claims the recent cabinet shuffle is the beginning of a popular rehabilitation of both premier and party, although he will not elaborate on how this will be accomplished and remains angry that NDP plotters are taking "a family fight into the streets of the neighbourhood." "It's bad form," he says. "These people saying these things—I didn't see them at the convention. Glen Clark was not supposed to win the 1996 election. He did. Now there are people out there gunning for him to be gone; they know he could win the next one."

University of Victoria political science professor Norman Ruff thinks that extremely unlikely. He argues Mr. Clark is designing his own timetable, buying time. He points out that while his leadership will be reviewed next spring, he can hardly imagine the premier sticking it out until then. He notes that the major polling companies will release new findings next month—one month after Mr. Justice Dohm is expected to raise the lid on the Pilarinos affair. The culmination of these events, combined with the special prosecutor's recommendation whether criminal charges should be laid and the conflict-of-interest report, both expected in September, could enrage the public and force Mr. Clark to see reason—or failing that, the plotters to act. Until then, Prof. Ruff contends, "He is basically saying, 'If you want me, you'll have to get me in March.'"

Reform MP John Reynolds, who was a cabinet minister under Mr. Vander Zalm, predicts the NDP will see the Socred coup in a rather different light and back Mr. Clark until 2001—the bitter end. The Social Credit Party no longer exists in any serious sense, so perhaps Mr. Vander Zalm unleashed the doomsday device after all. He concludes, "Glen Clark was elected for five years, and they're going to use it. They've probably realized that if they don't, they'll get booted out. It's common sense. Even the NDP isn't that stupid." BCR

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